

Regional and sub-regional effects on development policies

The Benelux and the Nordic countries compared

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Abstract: This is a comparative study of development policy behavior, testing the Europeanization hypothesis and the idea of sub-regional identification. It examines development policies of three Benelux countries and four Nordic countries. The comparison was partly quantitative, drawing from OECD data, and partly qualitative, based on policy analysis of similarities and differences in development policies of the countries under examination. The examination provides some evidence in support of the Europeanization hypothesis as far as the EU goals towards growth in member states' aid volume and commitment to policy coherence for development were concerned. The alternative explanation was found to be stronger in helping understand performance in multilateral aid and allocation of bilateral aid. Common to the countries under examination is that they approximate a corporatist type of political economy, which helps in understanding identification and norm diffusion within sub-regional schemes. Neither explanation proposed here succeeded in explaining commitment to donor coordination.

Keywords: aid, Benelux, development, EU, Europeanization, Nordic, policy, sub-regional

Regions and regionalism can offer the means to face the challenges of globalization and insecurity. However, regions are also contested spaces where "there are winners and losers, depending on how they are constituted" (Keating, 2011, p. 5). Indeed, close cooperation with larger countries may pose challenges to small states' autonomy. A much less studied aspect of small states is that they often lack the respect and status normally enjoyed by the larger countries. Because the international system does not necessarily need small states, they constantly have to prove themselves useful (Knudsen, 1996). Therefore, small states may find it beneficial to cooperate with neighboring small states in sub-regional schemes. Through



cooperation with other small states, it can be possible for these countries to achieve more important international reputations, respect and status than what they could have received individually.

European small states have rich experiences of sub-regional cooperation, thus making a virtue of the necessity caused by their smallness (Cottey, 2009).¹ They have developed several sub-regional cooperation schemes, such as the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). So far, however, two older and more institutionalized sub-regional schemes have proven to be more successful: the Benelux group (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and the Nordic group (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden).²

The Benelux and Nordic countries include the five best performing donors of development aid (Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the three Scandinavian countries³) as well as two relatively well-performing ones (Belgium and Finland). Finland, Norway and Sweden lead the 2015 Commitment to Development list of world's 27 richest countries, with Norway as the sixth and the Netherlands as the seventh (CGDev, 2015). There are also many similarities between these small, Northwestern European countries. Their sub-regional institutions, the Benelux Union and the Nordic Council do not, however, act in the issue area of development cooperation but focus their international activities on cooperation with similar regional organizations mainly in Europe. Nevertheless, the argument could be made that continued mutual cooperation molds small states' role perceptions and thereby also their foreign policies, including development policies. Indeed, the Nordic countries cooperated in the 1960s with common Nordic development projects in east Africa, and by the 1970s, the Scandinavian countries followed one another in achieving the international aid target. Similarly, the suggestion is that Luxembourg and, to a certain extent, Belgium have eventually learned from the Dutch performance. Then again, a competing argument could be built on the hypothesis that, in the long run, the overall European trends will make development policies more similar, thus diminishing the sub-regional differences. Perhaps other dividing lines will also grow in importance, such as northern Europe vis-à-vis southern Europe (Carbone, 2007); or the so-called old member states (EU-15) vis-à-vis new member states.

This article will add to the existing literature on European Union (EU) studies and development studies by testing the strengths of Europeanization and sub-regional identification in explaining development policies. It is also linked with the recent debates on European identities (Council of Europe 2013–2014) and on development policies (Sumner, 2010; Whitfield, 2009). The article proceeds as follows: I will first shortly present the

two sub-regional schemes, the Benelux Union and the Nordic Council, as background information. Thereafter, I will elaborate the two explanation strategies and the methods of the analysis. In the subsequent section, the underlying assumptions of the two explanation strategies will be tested by using comparative method and quantitative data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on development policy behavior over the 2000–2015 period. Finally, I will analyze similarities among and differences between the Benelux and Nordic countries' development policies by means of qualitative policy analysis. The analysis draws on policy documents of the countries concerned and other relevant literature. The analysis shows that whereas Europeanization explains certain member states' commitment to aid volume growth and to policy coherence for development (PCD), sub-regional identification provided a better explanation to multilateralism and the allocation of bilateral aid. In the conclusion of this article, I will argue that not only does norm diffusion takes place through the major international institutions, but sub-regional identification might also mold states' role perceptions and policies.

Two sub-regional schemes

Several common features unite the Benelux (also known as Low Countries) and the Nordic countries (the Nordics). First, they all are relatively small, northwestern European countries, geopolitically situated between two larger countries; France and Germany (Benelux) or Germany and Russia (Nordics). Second, countries in both groups share similar cultural, historical and linguistic elements and are increasingly interdependent. Third, both groups have voluntarily established a “security community” (Deutsch 1957) where intra-state war has become unthinkable.⁴ Finally, the countries under examination are known for their successful economic development and well-developed democracies. They also have relatively low corruption (or high trust) and low economic inequality (or fairness) (see Table 1 in Appendix). High trust and fairness, in turn, explain why people in the Nordic and Benelux countries are more likely to perceive economic pro-environmental instruments as effective (Harring, 2014).

Both sub-regional frameworks have played the role of a model, though in very different ways. In relation with the EU, the Benelux Union presents itself as a forerunner of and “testing-ground” for the European integration (Eyck, 1954, p. 65; Maes & Verdun 2005, p. 6). Today the Benelux scheme is put forward to the Baltic group and the Visegrad group as a model of sub-regional scheme within the EU. In fact, Benelux is the only sub-regional organization recognized by the EU.

Whereas Benelux positions itself within the mainstream of the European integration, the Nordic countries have traditionally branded themselves as an alternative movement and exceptional case (Browning, 2007; Mouritzen, 1995; Waever, 1992). The Nordic brand has been established as an alternative in different ways: first, as peaceful bridge-builder versus the Cold War setup; second, as a model of international solidarity and bridge-builder versus the North–South divide; and third, as egalitarian societies versus capitalist neo-liberalism and state socialism. Ingebritsen (2002, p. 13) has shown that the Nordic countries have acted as “norm entrepreneurs” in various issue areas important to them, including development aid. At first, the Nordic countries’ relationship with the EU remained more distant, not only because of their different branding but also because of various geographical, historical, cultural, and political reasons. Denmark, however, joined the European community already within the first wave of enlargements, in 1973, together with Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK). Finland and Sweden acceded to the EU only within the third wave, in 1995, together with Austria. The Norwegians have twice rejected the membership and thus remain outside of the EU. Iceland is no longer a member candidate of the EU. However, as members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), European Economic Area (EEA) and the Schengen area, Iceland and Norway are indirectly influenced by the Europeanization.

The Benelux Union

Cooperation between the Low Countries started during World War II, when their governments in exile decided on intergovernmental cooperation. The Benelux Customs Union (*l’Union douanière Benelux*) was established in 1944 and became operational in 1948. Ten years later, the Treaty of Benelux Economic Union (*l’Union économique Benelux*) was signed, and that union became operational in 1960. A new Treaty of Benelux was signed in 2008, and the organization was renamed the Benelux Union (*l’Union Benelux*). The treaty entered into force in January 2012. Thereafter sub-regional cooperation focused on three themes: internal markets and economic union, sustainable development, and justice and internal affairs. The Benelux institutions include the Benelux Committee of Ministers, Council, Parliament, and the Court of Justice.

The Low Countries were first united in the Congress of Vienna (1815), where the Austrian Low Lands (Belgium and Luxembourg) were given to the Netherlands. By the 1830s, Belgium and Luxembourg became independent and were guaranteed a neutral status by the great powers. However, their neutrality did not prevent Germany from occupying them in

World War I and subsequently all Low Countries during World War II. Thereafter neutrality had lost its popularity, and the Benelux countries joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU as original members. Collectively, the Benelux countries have the same number of votes in the European Council as any of the big four (France, Germany, Italy, and the UK) (Frentz, 2010, p. 134).

In addition to their common experiences as small states caught between France and Germany, social and cultural ties unite the Benelux countries. Yet, they are very different in size; Belgium (11.3 million), Luxembourg (0.6 million) and the Netherlands (17 million) together have 29 million people, divided very unequally between the three countries. The structure of the economies also differs, with Luxembourg exporting mainly services and Belgium and the Netherlands both services and industrial goods (Benelux, 2001, p. 17). Except for the very wealthy Luxembourg (gross national income [GNI]/capita at \$77,000), Belgium (\$44,360) and the Netherlands (\$48,940) are closer to the OECD countries' average national wealth (GNI/capita at \$40,241).⁵

After a crisis in the early 1950s, the heyday of cooperation in this framework was in the 1950s and 1960s (Eyck, 1954; Rood, 2010, p. 126). Overall, Benelux economic integration process has developed well, whereas political cooperation has progressed less far (Lepszy & Woyke, 1985, pp. 213–216). Trausch (2005) has explained the problem with the Dutch reluctance to cooperate with the smaller partners because the Netherlands would rather portray itself as a large EU member state. However, the Low Countries are increasingly integrated, and they regularly cooperate both through the Benelux institutions and bilaterally.

The Nordic Council

The Nordic Council is the Nordic parliamentary cooperation forum. It was established in 1952 by Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Finland joined only in 1955 when its post-war international status was stabilized. The Nordic Council of Ministers was established in 1971 for intergovernmental cooperation. Both institutions are guided by the Helsinki Treaty (1962), which has been subsequently amended several times. Following the re-independence of the Baltic countries in the early 1990s, their membership of the Nordic Council was discussed but rejected. However, the Nordic countries cooperate closely with the Baltic countries within the Nordic–Baltic Eight (NB8) community. Nordic international cooperation focuses on three areas: the Baltic Sea region (together with the Baltic States and Russia), Belarus (together with the EU) and the Arctic region (together with Canada) (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2011, p. 15).

From 1397 to 1521, the Nordic kingdoms were united under the Kalmar Union. Thereafter the Nordic region was divided between Denmark (including Iceland and Norway) and Sweden (including Finland). Cooperation between Nordic civil society organizations dates back to the nineteenth century. In 1875, Denmark and Sweden created a Scandinavian monetary union, which lasted until World War I. Norway became independent in 1905, Finland in 1917 and Iceland in 1944. After World War II, there were attempts to create a Nordic defense union (1949) or an economic union (1970), but they did not materialize. In comparison with the Benelux, the Nordic area is a mosaic: Denmark, Iceland, and Norway joined NATO while Sweden and Finland remain non-allied. Iceland and Norway are members of the EFTA but not the EU; Denmark, Finland and Sweden have joined the EU, but only Finland is a euro-zone country. At the United Nations (UN), however, the five Nordic countries are known as an active group with a common view on most issues.

Except for Iceland (around 0.3 million) and Sweden (9.8 million), the other Nordic countries are of rather same size: Denmark (5.7 million), Finland (5.5 million) and Norway (5.2 million)—altogether 26.5 million inhabitants. Industrializing relatively late, the Nordic economies have recently undergone rapid structural changes, with the growing service sector and technology intensive industries becoming lead sectors. Except for the oil-wealthy Norway (GNI/capita at \$65,152), the Nordic countries are close to the OECD average national wealth—Finland (\$42,622) somewhat lower than Denmark (\$50,635) and Sweden (\$50,282). Despite their differences regarding the European integration process, the Nordic economies are increasingly integrated.

The Nordic cooperation has seen its ups and downs. The sudden end of the Cold War left the Nordic community to seek a new identity (Mouritzen, 1995; Waever, 1992). Over the past decades, “Nordic co-operation has remained in the shadow of other forms of international cooperation” (Tiilikainen & Korhonen, 2011, p. 6). Moreover, Browning claims that unified support for the Nordic model has been dissipated and “elements of the Nordic practices and the Nordic model have become Europeanized” (2007, p. 44). Nevertheless, the idea remains popular among the Nordic people, and informal cooperation takes place far beyond the institutional frameworks of Nordic cooperation.

Explanation strategies and methods of the analysis

The conventional realist or power politics theory refers to post-colonial relations as well as donor political and economic interests as the principal

explanation of aid policies (Morgenthau 1962). Such a theory also explains rather well the Great Powers' aid policies, particularly during the Cold War era (Adda & Smouts, 1989; Conteh-Morgan, 1990). However, because the systemic role of smaller states is usually different from that of larger states, it is no wonder that their aid policies are guided more by humanitarian motives than by strategic goals (Cassen et al., 1982; Hook, 1995; Schraeder et al., 1998; Stokke, 1989). This is not to claim that commercial or political interests would not play a role in the aid policies of smaller donors, but only to maintain that the grand lines (e.g., decisions on the main recipients of aid) are not informed by strategic concerns in the first place. In fact, quite contrary to the expectation of small states' preoccupation with security concerns, humanitarian motives were found to explain their aid policies irrespective of changing power constellations, both during and after the Cold War period (Hoadley, 1980; Siitonen, 2005). Therefore, we need alternative explanations informed more by constructivist theories than by power politics. To examine the role of regional and sub-regional effects on development policies, I will consider two alternative explanations, labeled here Europeanization and sub-regional identification. Whereas Europeanization has received growing interest, particularly since the late 1980s, sub-regional identification is a new avenue of research in development policy studies.

Europeanization of development policies

While development policy is an original area of EU external affairs, dating back to the Treaty of Rome (1957), it is still an understudied area of European politics (Arts & Dickson, 2004, p. 3; Grimm et al., 2012, p. 9). The EU (2006) presents itself as the largest provider of development aid, the leading trade area for developing countries' exports and the largest provider of humanitarian aid. However, it was only in the Lisbon Treaty (2007) that development policy was officially recognized as an area of EU's external relations, along with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Trade Policy. Overall, the European development policy has become more active in the 2000s with two common development policy documents: the European Consensus on Development (2006) and the Agenda for Change (2011). Nevertheless, attempts to "Europeanize" the member states' development policies have remained a challenge for several reasons (Carbone, 2007; Stocchetti, 2011, pp. 4–7).

There are three broad approaches to the study of Europeanization (or EU-ization, in *stricto sensu*): European integration, top-down Europeanization and bottom-up Europeanization (Radaelli, 2006, p. 60, cited in Lightfoot, 2010, pp. 330–331). In development policies, the integration

process has deeply molded the community development policies, from the early Yaoundé Convention (1964–1975) focusing mainly on French Africa, to the multiregional Lomé Convention (1976–1999), to the current universal pyramid of regional arrangements (Bartels, 2007; Hurt, 2003). However, Europeanization of development policies is often understood “mainly to involve the downloading of policies due to the asymmetrical power relationship” (i.e., top-down Europeanization) (Grabbe, 2006, pp. 4–5, cited in Lightfoot, 2010, p. 331). Similarly, the analysis is here limited to top-down Europeanization, or how the EU affects development policies of the countries under examination. Nevertheless, the role of bottom-up Europeanization cannot be wholly ignored. The Nordic countries as well as the Netherlands have been active in placing issues on the EU development agenda, such as gender, sustainable development, and policy coherence, which will make it difficult to make causal claims.

Top-down Europeanization may refer to the effect of substantive policy norms, policy practices and procedural norms (Moumoutzis, 2011, p. 619). The European Community development policy norms, as set in the EU development policy documents, include collective commitment to poverty eradication and sustainable development, where the former refers to the UN declaration of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the latter to “good governance, human rights and political, economic, social and environmental aspects” (EU, 2006, p. 2). Furthermore, the EU is committed to promoting, in all its external relations, common values such as peace, democracy, gender equality, solidarity and justice, as well as effective multilateralism (EU, 2006, p. 3). Nevertheless, the EU is not the only actor that pursues such norms; among others, the OECD and the United Nations (UN) also pursue similar values (King, 2016). Therefore, the EU is not the only plausible source of policy change of this type. It is only so in the context of Europeanization, or when “considered appropriate within the EU context” (Moumoutzis, 2011, p. 620). A good example of the latter is the EU adopted timetable for member states’ aid level to be attained by 2015, which was a particularly successful policy initiative of the European Commission (Carbone, 2007). Europeanization is at work always when this timetable is referred to.

The Community development policy practices refer to policy instruments, such as trade and regional integration, development aid, humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention and peace-building. Whereas trade and integration policies belong to Community competence, aid and conflict prevention remain areas of shared competence. Thus, the member states remain sovereign over their own development policies that are not conditioned by *acquis communautaire*. EU policy practices in aid policy might, however, have an impact on the choice of aid recipients among

those countries considered by the EU to be “appropriate”: prioritizing the least developed countries (LDCs) and other low-income countries (LICs), particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁶ Similarly, the “logic of appropriateness” works by excluding non-democratic countries, such as Byelorussia and Zimbabwe, from the list of primary partners.⁷ A policy practice that recently has gained much attention is the EU commitment to advance PCD (Carbone & Keijzer 2016; EU, 2011, p. 11). PCD refers to policy areas that affect the situation of developing countries, from agriculture and fisheries to transport and energy. Then again, the EU is not the only development policy actor that promotes PCD in development policies (Siitonen, 2016; Verschaeve et al., 2016). Thus, EU policy practices can be seen to work in the context of Europeanization only when they are “considered appropriate within the EU context” (Moumoutzis, 2011, p. 620).

Finally, the procedural Community development policy norms are prescriptions for processes within and actions between the member states (and indirectly also member candidates). Procedural norms prescribing the relations between the member states include donor coordination and complementarity as well as harmonization in and alignment with recipient countries, including concentration of aid activities in each recipient country on a maximum of three sectors. The overall aim is to contribute to increasing aid effectiveness (EU, 2006, p. 6; EU, 2011, pp. 1–2). Once again, the EU is not the only actor that pursues such policies, but the OECD also pursues policies increasing development effectiveness, including harmonization and alignment. Europeanization comes into play only when explicitly referred to coordination with and complementarity between the EU.

Sub-regional identification

Since the 1980s, the dilemma of domestic governance in small countries has received larger attention. Faced by constant economic change and growing interdependence, the elites in industrialized small states need to choose economic and social policies that prevent the costs of change from causing political eruptions. Contrary to the general belief that liberalism and interventionism in the domestic policies are incompatible, small states in Europe have successfully responded to economic change with flexible policies of adjustment, specialization and generous domestic compensations (Katzenstein, 1985). Generous social expenditures, in turn, cause large governments. The argument could be made that, to compensate for economic adjustments, small states tend to opt for generous welfare state and large governments, which in turn explain relatively high aid levels, too.

In fact, qualitative studies have suggested that differences in domestic welfare policies explain the variation in the levels of aid (Lumsdaine,

1993; Stokke, 1989). Using a more rigorous approach, Noël and Thérien (1995) tested the hypothesis with comparative data on DAC donor states. Drawing from Esping-Andersen's (1990) institutional theory of welfare state, Noël and Thérien clustered the DAC donors into three types of industrial capitalism (liberal, conservative, and socialist) and managed to explain fairly well the variation in the aid volumes. With only a few exceptions, the index score for the socialist attribute of social policy (and the corresponding relatively large size of government) corresponded with aid volume performance from 1971 to 1989. Then again, following the overall trend toward liberalization in industrial economies and the related diversification of welfare state models since the 1980s, the types of industrial capitalism have evolved over the past three decades to the extent that the explanation may need further specifications.

Meanwhile the "varieties of capitalism" literature has contributed with a more dynamic analysis of the types of industrial capitalism (Kornelakis, 2011). Uwe Becker (2009, p. 15) comes up with a new typology of capitalisms, conceptualized as "open system-like configurations." Factors of openness refer not only to the obvious open territorial borders and the international division of labor but also to epistemological and ontological factors, such as diversity and lack of determinability within capitalisms (Becker, 2009, pp. 31–34). Openness leads to hybridization of cases, thus making any typology difficult to sustain. Therefore, Becker makes the important Weberian distinction between empirically given political economies, which are hybrids and may change, and the fixed ideal-typical varieties of capitalism. Drawing from the earlier "varieties of capitalism" literature, he then proposes four ideal types of capitalism to which countries may only approximate: the liberal model, corporatism, statism and meso-communitarianism (Becker, 2009, pp. 57–59).⁸ Except for the last type, to which only Japan and South Korea approximate, the other types coincide with historically grown constellations of democratic governance: competitive, consensual, and statist (Becker, 2009, pp. 92–94). For the purposes of this study, it suffices to concentrate on two ideal types: the liberal/competitive and the corporatist/consensual type. Countries most approximating the statist ideal type, such as France, Italy and Spain, differ much more from the countries under consideration here, and therefore remain less relevant as a reference group for this study. The remaining two ideal types of capitalism are defined as follows:

In the *liberal ideal type of capitalism*, the market governs almost every aspect of the economy and the room for state intervention is very limited. Unions and employers' associations are weak, and the capital-labor relation is largely individualized and adversarial.

The corporatist ideal type of capitalism is defined by the capital–labor relationship of institutionalized cooperation. Corporatist regulation partially corrects market regulation. (Becker, 2009, pp. 58–59)

The development of these two types of democratic capitalism draws from history: In the regions along the shores of the North Sea and post-tribal Danish and Swedish kingdoms, consensual practices have developed due to several reasons. One important factor was that social distances did not grow very huge. Even today, the Nordic countries figure among the most equalitarian countries, followed by the Benelux countries, as far as income distribution is concerned (see below [Table 1](#) in Appendix). This is an important difference from the historical development of liberal capitalism in the Anglo-Saxon countries that today are less equalitarian than the average OECD country ([Table 1](#)). Whereas in both types, reformation and its egalitarian principles had a strong impact, governance in the liberal Anglo-Saxon countries developed along the competitive pattern, which is likely to strengthen rather than diminish the social and class differences (Becker, 2009, pp. 92–94). Following this kind of analysis is to take a step away from centrifugal to sub-regional focus, from an institutional approach to one looking at policy processes from within the countries concerned. When looking at the national culture and identity as possible factors of external state behavior, we can make the hypothesis that countries learn from their relevant neighbors with which they mostly identify. “Relevance” means here, in the first place, similarity in type identity, and secondly, similarity in culture and identity. Accordingly, liberal countries tend to learn from other liberal countries in the first place and become even more liberal. National political economies most approximating the liberal ideal type are, “with considerable differences between e.g. the US and New Zealand, those of the Anglo-Saxon countries and, to a somewhat less extent, Ireland” (Becker, 2009, p. 58). Similarly, corporatist states tend to learn from other corporatist states to combine open economies with state interventionism. Political economies most approaching this type are the Nordic and Alpine countries, as well as the Netherlands. Belgium also reveals strong corporatist features (Becker, 2009, p. 59). According to Frenzt (2010, pp. 135–136), Luxembourg (which was not included in Becker’s analysis), too, can be characterized as corporatist.

Altogether, we have two competing explanation strategies, one emphasizing Europeanization and another similarities and differences in national type identities as the causal force. Both can be based on the constructivist ideas of norm diffusion (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). The suggestion is that, first, a specific interpretation of domestic values and principles evolves. Second, domestic principles and values are externalized into foreign relations, such as development policies. Third,

similar processes might take place in other countries through processes of imitation and cognitive development (Lucarelli, 2006, pp. 58–59). However, the idea of sub-regional identification adds here that norm diffusion is likely to be more successful in countries “where it resonates with historically constructed domestic norms” (Checkel, 1999, p. 87). Similarly, Orbie and Carbone make notion of “clustered convergence of members with a similar political, historical and geographical background such as the Nordic donors” (2016, p. 6). Sub-regional identification is at work when policy behavior is similar and identification is referred to in policy debates or documents.

Methods of the analysis

Earlier research on Europeanization has analyzed the EU’s impact on the formal adaption of rules, behavioral rule adaption as well as discursive adaption (Sedelmeier, 2013). Given the sovereignty of donor states over their development policies, the focus will be here on behavioral and discursive adaption. For similar reasons (the lack of material incentives), I will use a constructivist perspective focusing on positive normative resonance with domestic norms and discourses.

Hill and Wong (2011) have examined foreign policies of ten EU member states by ranking them along the scale of Europeanization. Drawing partly from that analysis (Orbie & Carbone, 2016), the conclusion of a recent study on Europeanization of development policies emphasizes the difference between rhetorical commitment to European approach and “path dependency [of long-established policies] and established cultural and normative structures” (Smith, 2016, p. 138). Therefore, I will first examine behavioral changes in development policies and only then look into discursive structures to find the source of norm diffusion.

Cottey (2009) discusses sub-regionalism and makes a qualitative analysis of the formation and roles of new sub-regional groups in Europe after 1990s, emphasizing their role in the peripheries of—and beyond—the larger regional structures (NATO, EU). Furthermore, Noël and Thérien (1995) successfully used clustering of donors along the type of industrial capitalism to explain variation in aid volumes. I will use here a similar method, taking into consideration the recent development in the “varieties of capitalism” literature.

In order to put the two explanation strategies into an empirical test, I will make a quantitative and comparative analysis and a qualitative policy analysis. The quantitative analysis will test whether the development policy behavior supports the underlying assumptions of Europeanization, on the one hand, and the expectation of difference based on the type

of political economy, on the other. I will use quantitative data of the DAC member countries' policy behavior in 2000–2015 for the test. Given the time frame, I will ignore the new EU member countries as well as Iceland and Korea that joined the DAC only after 2000. The variables will be explained later.

Insofar as the quantitative test supports the two explanation strategies, I will make a qualitative analysis to try to show to what extent the source of norm diffusion is Europeanization or sub-regional identification. The analysis will use the Benelux countries' and Nordic countries' development policy documents (listed in Appendix) and other relevant literature. However, there are issues that add to the complexity of the analysis: as previously mentioned, the EU is not the only organization that promotes development policy norms under examination. Secondly, the "Nordic Plus" group, consisting of the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, as well as Ireland and the UK, deserves attention, because it has played an important role in pursuing development policy norms both at the EU and the OECD.

Explaining development policy performance

In order to find out the extent of either Europeanization or sub-regional identification, I will first examine three quantifiable variables that can be considered important regime norms as well as focal means of achieving the MDGs—aid volume, multilateral funding, and the poverty orientation of bilateral aid.⁹ Aid volume is a politically important variable, subject to parliamentary decisions in democracies.¹⁰ Furthermore, the EU has adopted a timetable for its "old" (EU-15) member states' aid level to achieve 0.7% of GNI by 2015, with an intermediate collective target of 0.56% by 2010 (EU, 2006, p. 5). Multilateral funding, in turn, is usually considered to indicate the regime strength; the sum of bilateral aid relationships would hardly qualify as an international regime (Ruggie, 1983). Multilateralism is also one of the principal values promoted by the EU. Finally, poverty reduction can be considered the ultimate goal of the aid regime, as set in the MDGs for the years 2000–2015. Accordingly, the poverty orientation of an aid program can be seen as an indication of donor commitment to the goal. The EU also prioritizes the LDCs and other LICs, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (EU, 2006, p. 2) Nevertheless, since development policies can be influenced by national, regional and global actors who may pursue similar goals, it is often difficult to show the causal link. Furthermore, Europeanization can also take place "horizontally," from member state to another, "even in areas where the EU's *de jure* competences are

very weak," such as development policies (Orbie & Carbone, 2016, p. 5). Therefore, I will first examine quantitative changes in development policies from 2000 to 2015. To the extent that the policy change met the EU goals, I will then examine policy documents to find out evidence for the claim that the change took place either in the context of Europeanization or in the context of sub-regional identification.

Aid volume

Comparative data on donor performance is available from the member states of the OECD, which has agreed on what counts as official development assistance (ODA). The international aid target dates back to the early 1970s when the UN General Conference set the target level at 0.7% of industrial countries' gross national product (GNP). Industrial countries have never collectively attained this level, but the target remains an international aid policy norm that is regularly referred to in the context of official development assistance. Since 2000, the OECD has replaced GNP with GNI as the measure for ODA level.

In absolute terms, EU member countries provide over half of all ODA. In relative terms, DAC–EU countries contributed, on average, at the level of 0.47% (ODA/GNI) in 2015. That was slightly higher than the average DAC country level at 0.41%. In the same year, the countries under examination provided almost a fifth (17.6%) of the total aid from DAC area (the Benelux together 6% and the Nordics 11.6%). However, in relative terms, the Benelux countries scored, on average, 0.71% and the Nordic countries 0.96% of GNI.¹¹ In comparison with DAC member countries approaching liberal type of political economy (i.e., Anglo-Saxon countries), those approaching corporatist type scored much better, with over double ODA/GNI numbers (see [Table 1](#) in Appendix).

The EU goal for the old (EU-15) member states' target of ODA was set at 0.51% by 2010 and at 0.75% by 2015 (EU, 2006, p. 5). Because four EU member countries (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden) surpassed the international aid target already by 2000, the intermediate collective target was set at 0.56%. By 2010, eight EU member countries met the intermediate target: the three Benelux countries, the three Nordic EU-member countries, as well as Ireland and the UK. However, only four of them did so by increasing their aid levels (Belgium, Finland, Ireland and the UK). Finland (2012, p. 11) also explicitly referred to its commitment to the EU goal whereas Belgium (2013, art. 9) set the goal in its national law on development cooperation. The EU-15 countries' average record, however, remained far below the collective target (at 0.44%). Norway, which is not an EU member country, topped with 1.1% aid level.

The EU adopted goal for member states to achieve 0.7% of GNI by 2015 was met only by five member states (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and the UK), of which the UK was the only one to meet the target by increasing its aid level. Belgium and Finland faced economic problems and, contrary to their commitment to the common EU goal, failed to attain it. Thus, the EU-15 countries' collective record remained at 0.52%, far below the collective goal. In 2015, Sweden topped at 1.4% aid level.

In sum, the outcome was mixed. On the one hand, the intermediate EU target was met by most EU-15 member countries, with four countries meeting the target after having their aid levels increased. On the other, the final 2015 goal was only met by five countries, one of which had its aid level increased. Consequently, the EU collective target, too, remained unattained. Of the countries under investigation, Belgium scored even lower (0.42%) in 2015 than it did in 2010 and Finland only at the same level (0.55%) (see [Table 1](#) in Appendix). The analysis gives slight support for the Europeanization hypothesis. As for the hypothesis on differences based on the type of political economy, the test gives a strong support.

Multilateral funding

A clear majority of development assistance has always been bilateral and is likely to remain so. Moreover, there are neither universal targets for multilateral aid, nor an *acquis* for the EU member states' contribution.¹² Within the area of multilateral aid funding, the EU plays a double role, as both a multilateral organization delivering the funding coming from the member states and as a donor to other multilateral aid organizations (OECD, 2009, p. 42). The member states' contributions include both voluntary funding to the European Development Fund (EDF) and quasi automatic funding through the member state quotas to the Community budget, of which development activities financed by the European Commission, are considered multilateral aid and reallocated back to each member state on a pro rata basis (OECD, 2009, p. 21).

Over the past decades, the multilateral share of ODA from the OECD area has remained stable, around 30% of the total aid (excluding debt relief).¹³ At the same time, contributions through the EU institutions have increased whereas the share through other multilateral aid organizations has somewhat declined, from 22% in 1989 to 20% in 2008 (OECD, 2009, p. 10). In proportional terms, the average DAC member channeled 0.09% of its GNI to core funding of multilateral agencies in 2014–2015. The Nordic countries' average record was 0.27% while that of the Benelux countries was 0.24%. These figures are more than double the DAC average and show very high commitment to multilateralism. In comparison with

the Anglo-Saxon countries' average at 0.10%, corporatist countries again stand out with over double average record (see [Table 1](#) in Appendix).

To summarize, the EU member countries tend to contribute to multilateral aid institutions slightly more than other OECD countries. However, the leading multilateralists are found among the Benelux and Nordic countries, thus supporting the hypothesis on differences based on the type of political economy. In addition, the Nordic countries have their traditional solidarity toward the UN institutions. The membership of the EU has not changed that tradition.

Poverty orientation of aid

Discussion on aid allocation has taken a new turn with the notion that the demographically larger part of poor people lives in countries such as China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan that are now considered middle-income countries (MICs). Sumner (2010) has provided evidence showing that, unlike in the early 1990s when most of the world's poor lived in LICs, today a clear majority, around three-quarters, of poor people live in MICs. Then again, Collier (2008) argues that aid should be focused on the most fragile "Bottom Billion" countries that are also among the poorest countries. In any event, the EU and other development institutions promote the norm that bilateral ODA should be allocated in preference to LDCs and other low-income countries, particularly to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since most of the LDCs are in Sub-Saharan Africa, the preference for LDCs can be taken as the overall indication of poverty orientation of an aid program.

LDCs received just around a third of the total net aid (i.e., including imputed multilateral ODA) from DAC countries. Together with other LICs, the share added to around half. The other half went to MICs. However, several donors allocated more than half of their total ODA to LDCs (Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, the Nordic countries and UK) whereas the DAC–EU country average was only around 40%.

In relative terms, the average DAC country allocated 0.14% of its GNI to the least developed countries in 2014–2015. That is somewhat less than the UN recommendation (0.15%) from the year 1981. The Benelux countries provided, on average, 0.24%, while the Nordic average was 0.27%. That was, once again, double the average Anglo-Saxon country contribution (0.13%)—though the UK record at 0.26% was closer to the Benelux and Nordic averages (see [Table 1](#) in Appendix).

Altogether, the short quantitative examination gave some evidence to the Europeanization hypothesis and strong evidence to the hypothesis on differences based on the type of political economy. The EU-15 countries are slightly more benevolent donors, more multilateralist and more pov-

erty-oriented in their development policies than DAC countries on average. The countries under examination perform clearly much better.

Above all, the corporatist type of political economy seems to be a significant factor, since such countries tend to be particularly good aid performers. In comparison with the Anglo-Saxon donor countries approximating the liberal type, the difference is very clear: with the exception of the UK, all other donor countries approximating the liberal type performed less than the DAC country average in the three dimensions examined earlier (except Ireland, which is only intermediate liberal) (see [Table 1](#) in Appendix). In this context, however, Belgium and Finland differ with their lower aid record from other countries under examination. Whereas Belgium is characterized only as intermediate level corporatist, Finland is a striking exception with its high score on corporatism but a clearly lower aid record than the other Nordic countries in all dimensions except multilateralism. Altogether, the type of political economy is a strong candidate for explaining variation in development policies but far from the only factor. Let us therefore consider some qualitative aspects that could help explain the role of Europeanization vis-à-vis sub-regional schemes on development policies: allocation of bilateral aid, commitment to advance PCD as well as commitment to donor coordination. In the following section I will look closer into similarities among and differences between individual Benelux and Nordic countries.

Understanding qualitative similarities and differences

Allocation of bilateral aid

The significant historical difference between the two sub-regions under examination is that all the Benelux countries had their colonial histories, whereas the Nordic countries hardly had such histories.¹⁴ Belgium administered a large area in central Africa (ten times Belgium's own area) that is today known as Democratic Republic of Congo, in addition to the smaller territories of Burundi and Rwanda. These three African countries are today top recipients of Belgian aid. During the Belgian-Luxembourgian economic union, a good number of Luxembourgian companies and individuals served in the Belgian Congo, from 1922 to Congo's independence in 1960. Luxembourgers were considered equal to Belgians, and many of them served in the colonial administration (Moes, 2010). The Netherlands once had the third largest colonial empire. Although the British later took over the Dutch possessions in South Africa and North America, the Netherlands still had the huge Indonesian area until 1945. Today Indonesia is one of the top recipients of Dutch aid (see [Table 2](#) in Appendix).

Differences in colonial histories also make understandable the differences in the formation of the aid programs. The Benelux countries started their aid programs individually. Belgium focused on its former African colonies until the early 1990s, when those were struck by political crises (Holvoet & Renard, 2005, p. 136). The Dutch aid program, too, was strongly characterized by colonial relationships (Riddell, 2008, p. 97). At first, Luxembourg abstained from the aid regime altogether, because it “had not been a colonial power” and therefore had no moral responsibility (Hoebink, 2005, pp. 379). However, after 1977 political parties and the NGO sector put growing pressure to raise the aid volume. The aid gradually increased and Luxembourg became a member of the DAC in 1992.

Without significant colonial experiences of their own, the Nordic countries were largely dependent on their missionary and humanitarian NGOs for personnel with experiences of development work. Therefore, they first sought to cooperate in common Nordic projects. Common projects were run in eastern Africa (Tanganyika, Kenya) during the early 1960s. By the 1970s, cooperation in the form of common Nordic projects ended, but policy cooperation continued particularly in Southern Africa (i.e., the Nordic–Southern African Development Coordination Conference [SADCC] initiative). In 1989, the Nordic Development Fund (NDF) was established to provide development credits. Since 2009, the NDF has also funded climate change related investments in LICs. The NDF operations are funded from the development cooperation budgets of the five Nordic countries.¹⁵

Differences in the size and histories of the countries concerned also help understand differences in the patterns of allocation of bilateral aid. First, the amount of priority countries (or long-term partners) varies significantly between the countries under examination. Whereas Sweden has 34 priority partner countries and Denmark 21, others have less than 20 (the Netherlands 15 and Belgium 14, Luxembourg and Finland both 9). However, these numbers have gradually decreased (except for Sweden), thus showing commitment to the OECD and EU recommendation to focus bilateral aid, as set in the Paris Declaration of 2005. Similarly, over half (52%) of Luxembourg’s bilateral aid and over a third (35%) of Finland’s bilateral aid is focused on their top ten recipients. In this respect, the Netherlands (14%) and Sweden (19%) scored much lower (see [Table 2](#) in Appendix).¹⁶

Second, almost half (23 of 53) of priority partner countries are in Africa South of Sahara, which is a European trend, as mentioned earlier. Correspondingly, Africa South of Sahara receives, on average, over half (53%) of net ODA disbursements (including imputed multilateral flows) from the countries under examination. Another focus area is South and Central Asia, where Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Nepal belong to partner countries. In Far East Asia, Myanmar and Viet Nam are favorites. In

the Middle East, Palestinian territories are favored by all countries under examination. Along with the graduation of many Latin American countries to MICs, aid to South and Central America has declined, with only Sweden still having several partner countries there. Similarly in North Africa, only Morocco figures in the Belgian list of partner countries. Except for the Swedish aid program, European countries no longer figure among the primary recipients of aid from the countries under examination.

Third, there are clear sub-regional tendencies in the allocation of ODA. Gates and Hoffer (2004) found that the Nordic countries are different when it comes to aid allocation. The Nordics give mainly untied aid and mostly to poor countries. Political allies (based on the index on UN voting behavior) seem to be insignificant in their aid allocation, unlike in the case of larger DAC donors. On closer examination, the aid policy profiles of Norway and Sweden, on one hand, and Denmark and Finland, on the other, were closer to each other. Furthermore, unlike commonly accepted assumptions, the allocation patterns of Canada and the Netherlands were found to be different from the Nordic ones. Selbervik & Nygaard (2006) also found similarities in Danish and Finnish aid programs and, on the other hand, in Norwegian and Swedish programs; private interests had more impact in the former than in the latter pair. A look at today's list of primary partner countries confirms the continuation of the strong Nordic emphasis in Eastern Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia). Other Nordic favorites include Nepal and Myanmar in Asia as well as Mali in Western Africa—all poor and hardly any political allies to the Nordics. As for the Benelux group, sub-regional tendencies are also evident. Belgian and Luxembourgian aid goes primarily to French-speaking West Africa (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) due to historical and linguistic relations. The Netherlands has partner countries both in West and East Africa, many of them similar with Belgium (Benin, Burundi, Mali, Mozambique and Rwanda). At the same time, colonial relations continue to play a role in the Belgian (Congo, Burundi and Rwanda) and Dutch (Indonesia) aid programs (see [Table 2](#) in Appendix).

Commitment to advance PCD

According to the EU, “member states are responsible for ensuring policy coherence for development in their national policies,” and to “have their own coordination mechanisms in place” (EU, 2015, p. 14). All countries under examination are strongly committed to PCD in their aid policy documents, including Norway (2011), which is not an EU member. Some member states, such as Finland (2012), Luxembourg (2012), Sweden (2013) and Denmark (2014) have made explicit references to the relevant EU treaty (article 208

of the Lisbon Treaty) when addressing PCD in their legal or policy papers. Moreover, Denmark has translated the commitment to PCD into a strategy with action plans and targets, which is “a very strong sign of political commitment” (CONCORDE, 2015, p. 5; DANIDA, 2014). As for the implementation of policy coherence, all countries under examination have developed interministerial coordination mechanisms. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has a Project Team for PCD (CONCORDE, 2015, p. 6).

Altogether, Europeanization can be found to have worked at least in the cases of Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden. Then again, Finland, which was regarded as “a leader in pursuing coherent policies for development” (OECD, 2014, p. 2), has recently decreased its commitment to PCD. The development policy program of the new government no longer mentions PCD (Finland, 2016). At the same time, the effects of the OECD and sub-regional identification could also explain the case of the Norwegian commitment to PCD.

Commitment to donor coordination

Donor coordination is a recurrent theme of international development conferences, from the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and to the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. The EU, too, has made recommendations toward further donor coordination, from the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 9 and 151) to the 2012 Agenda for Change (“Increasing the impact of the EU Development Policy”) declaration. According to estimations, hundreds of millions of Euros “could be saved annually if the EU and its member states concentrated their aid efforts on fewer countries and activities; and ... if country allocation was completely coordinated” (EU, 2013, p. 4). In principle, the presence of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in most partner countries provides a means for effective coordination, but in practice the progress has been frustratingly slow per the report to the European Parliament (EU, 2013). It appears that competition for export markets and political support prevents donor countries from closer coordination of aid activities (Fuchs et al., 2013).

The principal aim of donor coordination is to increase aid effectiveness and reduce transaction costs. The countries under examination are very committed to donor coordination. In Belgium (2013, art. 16:5), EU joint programming is even enshrined in law. However, a major step toward the implementation of this goal is taken by the group of seven countries known as the “Nordic Plus” countries (Ireland, Netherlands, Nordics and UK), who have agreed on delegated cooperation arrangements. Due

to similarities in their policies and administrative procedures of aid, these countries could agree on “lead donor” arrangement, where one donor acts with authority on behalf of other donors in country program, sector program or project (Norad, 2006). The Nordic Plus group includes both EU member countries and those who are not (Norway), and countries from both sub-regional schemes as well those beyond them (Ireland, UK). Therefore, it appears safe to presume that the primary initiator behind donor coordination is neither the EU nor sub-regional identification.

Conclusions

The aim of this article has been to compare two explanations to development policy behavior, the Europeanization hypothesis and the idea of sub-regional identification. For that reason, two sub-regional schemes between European donor countries—the Benelux and the Nordic countries—were examined. The two sub-regional institutions of the countries under examination are not, however, active in development policies of their member states. The comparison was partly quantitative and drew from OECD data on development aid between 2000 and 2015. In addition, similarities and differences in development policy programs of the countries under examination were analyzed by means of qualitative policy analysis. The analysis shows not only that norm diffusion takes place through the major international institutions but also that cooperation in sub-regional schemes may mold states’ role perceptions and policies.

The idea of Europeanization as an intervening variable affecting how national interests are understood in member countries refers to top-down Europeanization. This article provides evidence in support of such effect in several instances. In the case of aid volume, Belgium and Finland showed political commitment to the EU collective aid goals and met the intermediate goal in 2010, even if they did not meet the proper goal of 0.7% of donor GNI in 2015 (all other countries under examination met this goal already in 2000). Similarly, Europeanization was found to work in commitment to advance PCD. Such commitment was, nevertheless, not found in some other normative policy goals of the EU, such as multilateralism and poverty orientation of aid programs. Neither was such commitment found in donor coordination, which has been one of the EU’s long-term goal in development policy.

The alternative explanation to development policy behavior examined here was sub-regional identification. It departs from the “varieties of capitalism” literature and the idea that countries with similar type of political economy tend to learn from each other, particularly when they also

share similar cultural and geographical characters. The countries under examination were found to approximate corporatist type of political economy, vis-a-vis the most relevant comparative case, the Anglo-Saxon countries that mainly approximate liberal types of political economy. As far as development policies are concerned, there is a clear difference between the two types of countries with the former meeting the aid regime norms much better than the latter. Furthermore, the Benelux and Nordic countries share several features that make norm diffusion likely to be more successful. Typically, the leading performers in development policies are found among these countries. Accordingly, sub-regional identification can be expected to influence development policy decisions. Such effect was found in relatively high multilateralism, particularly among the Nordic countries. The aid programs also showed relatively high poverty orientation, which upon closer analysis was found to be partly due to colonial and political relations with African countries. Nevertheless, there were clear sub-regional tendencies in the allocation of bilateral aid, not only in Africa but also in Asia.

Finally, certain issues would cry for further analysis. The very similar aid policy behavior of Norway, which is not a member of the EU, strongly challenges the Europeanization effect in favor of the sub-regional identification. Nevertheless, neither of the explanations proposed here succeeded in helping to understand commitment to donor coordination, which was very much an effect of the Nordic Plus group of countries, including countries from both sub-regional groups as well as Ireland and the UK. Indeed, the aid policy behavior of the UK, as well as that of Ireland to some extent, appears to be much closer to the policies of the countries under examination than those of the other Anglo-Saxon countries.

Further analysis should look closer into the mechanisms of norm diffusion and norm entrepreneurship. Mutual learning most likely takes place, on the one hand, through regular contacts and meetings between development ministers and other relevant national functionaries, for example in the context of the EU and UN conferences addressing development issues. On the other hand, there is much anecdotal evidence of informal cooperation between relevant neighboring countries, which probably influences national development policy discussions and planning processes. Further research should show how these links work.

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NOTES

1. Transnational region, which cuts across the boundaries of national states, is the third possibility for a very small state such as Luxembourg, which forms part of the *Grande Région*, together with Lorraine (France), Saarland and large parts of Rhineland-Palatine (Germany) and the Belgian provinces of Luxembourg and Liège.
2. Iceland joined the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2013; therefore, it is not included in the aid policy analysis of this study.
3. As a regional term, "Scandinavia" is composed of the three kingdoms of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, whereas the adjective "Nordic" includes Finland and Iceland. In the international usage, however, Scandinavia and the Nordic countries are often mixed.
4. Drawing from Immanuel Kant's idea of democratic peace, Karl W. Deutsch (1957) has introduced the concept of security community.
5. GNI per capita data drawn from the OECD.
6. Let us note in passing that the Community development aid still focuses more on middle-income countries (MICs) than on LICs. Whereas the MICs received around 40-50% of the Community aid, the LICs only received around 30-40% (Glennie, 2011, p. 9). However, aid from the EU member states concentrates on LICs.
7. The logic of appropriateness refers to "what constitutes standard, normal, right or good behavior within the context of the EU" (Moumoutzis, 2011, p. 615).
8. The ideal types are based on "criteria that point to *fundamental and overarching features* of capitalism distinguishing it from other politico-economic formations such as feudalism or state socialism. This meta-criterion is met by the relations between (wage) labour and (private) capital as well as by the relation between politics and the economy as largely separated entities" (Becker, 1999, pp. 53-54; italics in the original).
9. An international regime refers to "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue area of international relations." (Krasner, 1982). For suggestions of a tentative international aid regime, see Hook (1995); Lumsdaine (1993); Sogge (2002); Siitonen (2005); and Wood (1986; 1996).
10. Given the voluntary basis of aid supply, parliaments in donor countries retain the ultimate power to decide over aid budgets. Only pre-negotiated payments to multilateral organizations such as the World Bank are legally binding.

11. Data on ODA extracted from OECD.Stat and calculated by the author.
12. See discussion in Riddell (2008, pp. 86–88) and OECD (2009, p. 34).
13. OECD/DAC records aid contributions as multilateral only if they are core-funding, i.e., made to an inter-governmental development institution and pooled so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of the institution's financial assets (OECD, 2009, p. 68).
14. The short episodes of New Sweden (in the current US state of Delaware) from 1638 to 1655 and of Swedish trade posts in Africa and the Caribbean, or the much longer experience of the Danish West Indies, from 1672 to 1916, remained relatively insignificant in comparison with the Belgian Congo and the Dutch colonial possessions in Africa, Americas and Asia.
15. The NDF budget is around €1 billion. For details, see <http://www.ndf.fi>
16. Interestingly, the so-called priority partners do not always figure among the top ten recipients of aid. See [Table 2](#) in Appendix.

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Appendix 1: Official development assistance (ODA) and political economic type of 19 OECD countries

	ODA as % of GNI 2000–2009 average	ODA as % of GNI 2010–2015 average	ODA as % of GNI 2010	ODA as % of GNI 2015 (*)	Multi ODA as % of GNI 2014–2015 (**)	ODA to LDCs as % of GNI 2014–2015	Corruption Perception Index 2015 Score	Income distribution (Gini Coefficient, 2014)	Liberal	Statist	Corporatist
Belgium	0,46	0,50	0,64	0,42	0,10	0,15	77	0,268*	L	I	I
Luxembourg	0,85	1,01	1,09	0,95	0,21	0,42	81	0,281*	?	?	H
Netherlands	0,81	0,72	0,81	0,75	0,12	0,13	87	0,283	I	H	H
<i>(Benelux Average)</i>	<i>(0,71)</i>	<i>(0,74)</i>	<i>(0,85)</i>	<i>(0,71)</i>	<i>(0,14)</i>	<i>(0,23)</i>	<i>(82)</i>	<i>(0,275)</i>			
Denmark	0,89	0,86	0,90	0,85	0,16	0,23	91	0,254*	L	I	H
Finland	0,39	0,55	0,55	0,55	0,18	0,2	90	0,257	I	I	H
Norway	0,9	1,02	1,10	1,05	0,24	0,27	87	0,252*	L	H	VH
Sweden	0,9	1,07	0,94	1,40	0,31	0,29	89	0,281*	L	I	H
<i>(Nordic Average)</i>	<i>(0,77)</i>	<i>(0,88)</i>	<i>(0,87)</i>	<i>(0,96)</i>	<i>(0,22)</i>	<i>(0,25)</i>	<i>(89)</i>	<i>(0,261)</i>			
Austria	0,35	0,30	0,32	0,35	0,07	0,07	76	0,280*	L	H	VH
Germany	0,32	0,41	0,38	0,52	0,05	0,09	81	0,292*	I	I	H
Switzerland	0,39	0,47	0,41	0,52	0,11	0,13	86	0,295*	H	I	H
<i>(Average)</i>	<i>(0,35)</i>	<i>(0,39)</i>	<i>(0,37)</i>	<i>(0,46)</i>	<i>(0,08)</i>	<i>(0,10)</i>	<i>(81)</i>	<i>(0,289)</i>			
France	0,4	0,43	0,50	0,37	0,07	0,11	70	0,294*	L	H	L
Italy	0,18	0,18	0,15	0,22	0,04	0,06	44	0,325*	L	H	L
Spain	0,31	0,22	0,43	0,12	0,02	0,06	58	0,346*	I	H	L

<i>(Average)</i>	<i>(0,30)</i>	<i>(0,28)</i>	<i>(0,36)</i>	<i>(0,23)</i>	<i>(0,04)</i>		<i>(57)</i>	<i>(0,322)</i>			
Australia	0,27	0,33	0,32	0,29	0,06	0,06	79	0,337	H	I	L
Canada	0,28	0,29	0,33	0,28	0,07	0,08	83	0,322*	H	I	L
Ireland	0,45	0,40	0,53	0,32	0,07	0,22	75	0,309*	I	I	L
New Zealand	0,26	0,27	0,26	0,27	0,05	0,07	88	0,333*	H	L	L
UK	0,39	0,63	0,56	0,70	0,2	0,12	81	0,358*	H	I	L
US	0,16	0,19	0,21	0,17	0,03	0,04	76	0,394	VH	L	L
<i>(Average)</i>	<i>(0,3)</i>	<i>(0,35)</i>	<i>(0,37)</i>	<i>(0,34)</i>	<i>(0,08)</i>		<i>(80)</i>	<i>(0,342)</i>			
DAC country average	0,44	0,30	0,32	0,30	0,09%	0,14%		0,318 (OECD average)			
DAC-EU (15) country average	0,44	0,51	0,55	0,50	0,16%	0,16%		0,3 (OECD-EU average)			
Correlation with ODA level, 2000-2009 average									-0,567	0,127	0,639
Correlation with ODA level, 2010-2015 average									-0,490	0,02	0,626
Correlation with Corruption Perception Index 2015									0,162	-0,412	0,495
Correlation with income distribution (Gini Coefficient), 2014									0,754	-0,224	-0,772

(*) preliminary data; (**) excluding aid through the EU

Sources: OECD and Transparency International for numerical data; Becker (2009) for the types of political economies. The latter source does not include Luxembourg, which however is usually considered corporatist. VH = very high (3), H = high (2), I = intermediate (1), L = low (0)

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Appendix 2: Top ten recipients of aid and priority partner countries, in 2013–14

DONOR COUNTRY	Priority partner countries							
Top ten recipients, (% of gross bilateral ODA)	Europe	Africa North	Africa South of Sahara	South and Central America	Middle East	South and Central Asia	Far East Asia	Together
BELGIUM DR Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Palestinian terr., Viet Nam, Mozambique, Mali, Benin, Senegal, Peru (31%)		Morocco (1)	Benin , Burkina Faso, Burundi , DR Congo , Guinea, Mali , Mozambique , Niger, Rwanda , Senegal , Tanzania, Uganda (12)		Palestinian territories (1)			14
DENMARK Tanzania, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Uganda, Syria, Myanmar, Viet Nam (26%)			Burkina Faso , Ethiopia, Ghana , Kenya , Mali, Mozambique , Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania , Uganda, Zimbabwe (12)	Bolivia (1)	Palestinian territories (1)	Afghanistan , Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan (4)	Indonesia, Myanmar , Viet Nam (3)	21
FINLAND Tanzania, Kenya, Afghanistan, Zambia, Nepal, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Viet Nam, Somalia, Palestinian terr. (35%)			Ethiopia , Kenya , Mozambique , Somalia , Tanzania , Zambia (6)			Afghanistan , Nepal (2)	Myanmar (1)	9

<p>LUXEMBOURG Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, Laos, Niger, Capo Verde, Nicaragua, Viet Nam, El Salvador, Kosovo (52%)</p>			<p>Burkina Faso, Capo Verde, Mali, Niger, Senegal (5)</p>	<p>El Salvador, Nicaragua (2)</p>			<p>Laos, Viet Nam (2)</p>	<p>9</p>
<p>THE NETHERLANDS Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Mozambique, Mali, Rwanda, Syria, Benin, Indonesia (14%)</p>			<p>Benin, Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda (10)</p>		<p>Palestinian territories, Yemen (2)</p>	<p>Afghanistan, Bangladesh (2)</p>	<p>Indonesia (1)</p>	<p>15</p>
<p>NORWAY Brazil, Afghanistan, Pales- tinian ter., Malawi, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia, Syria, Ethiopia (29%)</p>			<p>Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania (7)</p>	<p>Haiti (1)</p>	<p>Palestinian territories (1)</p>	<p>Afghanistan, Nepal (2)</p>	<p>Myanmar (1)</p>	<p>12</p>

(continued)

SWEDEN Afghanistan, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, DR Congo, Somalia, Palestinian ter., South Sudan, Zambia, Bangladesh (19%)	Albania, Belarus, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine (10)		DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya , Liberia, Mali, Mozambique , Rwanda, Somalia , South Sudan , Sudan, Tanzania , Uganda, Zambia (14)	Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala (3)	Iraq, Palestinian territories , Syria (3)	Afghanistan , Bangladesh (2)	Cambodia, Myanmar, (2)	34
Number of priority countries	10	1	23	6	4	4	5	52

List of primary data sources on the countries under examination

Belgium

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Denmark

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Luxembourg

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Norway

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Efectos regionales y subregionales en políticas públicas del desarrollo: El Benelux y los países Nórdicos comparados

Lauri Sittonen

Resumen: Este estudio comparativo del comportamiento de la política pública de desarrollo prueba la hipótesis de Europeización y la idea de identificación subregional. Las políticas públicas de desarrollo de tres países de Benelux y cuatro países Nórdicos fueron examinadas. La comparación fue cuantitativa y cualitativa, basada en análisis de similitud de política pública y diferencias en las políticas de desarrollo. El examen provee evidencia que apoya la hipótesis de Europeización tan lejos como las metas de crecimiento de la UE en volumen de ayuda y compromiso de coherencia de política de desarrollo de los estados miembros eran considerados. Se encontró sólida en ayudar entender el desempeño de la cooperación multilateral y la asignación de cooperación bilateral. Los países bajo estudio aproximan un tipo corporativista de economía política, que ayuda entender la identificación y difusión de normas dentro de esquemas subregionales. Ninguna explicación propuestas explica el compromiso con la coordinación del donante.

Palabras clave: apoyo, Benelux, cooperación, desarrollo, Europeización, integración sub-regional, UE, Nórdicos

Les effets régionaux et sous-régionaux dans les politiques de développement : Une comparaison entre le Benelux et les pays nordiques

Lauri Siitonen

Résumé: Cette étude comparative évalue l'hypothèse de l'europeanisation et l'idée de l'identification sous-régionale. Elle examine les politiques de développement des pays membres de deux schémas européens sous-régionaux : les trois pays du Benelux et les quatre pays nordiques. La comparaison est en partie quantitative à partir des données de l'OCDE et en partie qualitative, car elle se fonde sur une analyse de politiques publiques des similarités et des différences dans les politiques de développement des pays étudiés. L'analyse apporte des éléments en faveur de l'hypothèse de l'europeanisation dans la mesure où les objectifs de l'EU en matière d'augmentation du volume de l'aide et de l'engagement en faveur de la cohérence des politiques publiques pour le développement (CPD) sont concernés. Cependant, l'explication alternative est avérée car elle permet de comprendre la performance de l'aide multilatérale et l'allocation de l'aide bilatérale. Un point commun entre les pays étudiés est qu'ils s'approchent d'un modèle corporatiste d'économie politique qui aide à comprendre l'identification et la diffusion normative à l'intérieur de cadres sous-régionaux. Cependant, aucune des explications propo-

sées ne réussit à expliquer l'engagement en matière de coordination des donateurs.

Mots clés: aide, Benelux, développement, européanisation, intégration sub-régionale, pays nordiques, UE

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